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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between airline network structure and airport
congestion. More specically, we study the ways in which airlines adjust frequencies to
delays (as a measure of airport congestion) depending on the network type they operate.
Our results suggest that network structure has a fundamental impact. Thus, while airlines
operating fully-connected congurations reduce frequencies in response to more frequent
delays, airlines operating hub-and-spoke structures increase frequencies. Therefore, net-
work airlines have incentives to keep frequencies high even if this is at the expense of a
greater congestion at their hub airports. This result sheds light on previously unclear
results in the literature.
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1 Introduction
Network airlines increasingly concentrate their services at a small number of hub airports at
which they channel a high proportion of their total ights. At these hubs, dominant network
carriers exploit transfer tra¢ c through coordinated banks of arrivals and departures. The
operation of such hub-and-spoke (HS) congurations enables airlines to reduce their costs since
they can exploit economies of tra¢ c density and o¤er high ight frequencies, the latter being
greatly valued by business and connecting passengers.1 As Flores-Fillol (2010) points out,
network carriers have strong incentives to add new routes to their HS networks because by
doing so they gain simultaneous access to one new local market and many connecting markets.
By o¤ering a wide diversied range of destinations, hub airports contribute substantially to
the competitiveness of rms located in the urban areas under their inuence.2 While low-cost
carriers may also concentrate their tra¢ c in just a few airports, they basically operate fully-
connected (FC) networks in which most air services are point-to-point.
However, the concentration of tra¢ c favored by HS networks has contributed to an increase
in airport congestion. Baumgarten et al. (2014) suggest that HS operations may aggravate
congestion problems at peak times because more ights are operated for a given capacity dur-
ing banks. Furthermore, the larger number of connecting passengers results in an increasing
complexity of airport and airline operations. Daniel and Harback (2008) show that dominant
airlines at many major US hub airports concentrate their ights at peak times, thereby forcing
non-hubbing airlines to cluster their tra¢ c in uncongested periods. The potentially negative
e¤ects associated with congestion may be substantial both for passengers and airlines, as re-
ported in several empirical studies. For example, Forbes (2008) uses data from New York-La
Guardia airport (one of the four slot constrained airports in the US) to study price responses
to ight delays. She nds an average price reduction per additional minute of delay of $1:42
for direct passengers; this price decrease amounts to $0:77 for connecting passengers. Britto
et al. (2012) examine the impact of delays on consumer and producer welfare for a sample of
US routes. They nd that delays raise prices and reduce demand. From their results, a 10%
decrease in delays implies a benet of $1:50-$2:50 per passenger, while the gains for airlines of
reducing delays are about three times higher. Peterson et al. (2013) use a recursive-dynamic
model to examine the costs of ight delays both for airlines and passengers, nding that a 10%
reduction in delayed ights increases net US welfare by $17:6 billion.
HS networks, therefore, are associated with both positive and negative e¤ects. The em-
pirical challenge consists in ascertaining which of these two dominates. This paper aims at
understanding the extent to which airlines react to airport congestion. More specically, we
seek to test the impact of airline network type on carriersreactions to congestion: that is, do
1
airlines operating HS and FC networks behave di¤erently?
A closely related study to the one conducted here is provided by Bilotkach et al. (2013).
Drawing on data for the period 2007-2011, they study the impact of the merger between Delta
and Northwest on the distribution of tra¢ c between primary and secondary hubs, considering
the potential negative e¤ect of increased congestion at the main hub airports. They report a
post-merger redistribution of tra¢ c in favor of primary hubs and no e¤ect of congestion as a
brake on this concentration of tra¢ c. The authors claim that they are surprised by this apparent
indi¤erence of the merged entity (Delta-Northwest) to congestion and speculate that it might
be due to the economic downturn following the nancial crisis in 2008. Our study sheds further
light on this puzzling outcome.
Most studies of airport congestion analyze the relationship between delays and airport con-
centration, focusing on the internalization debate. The internalization hypothesis states that
airlines at heavily concentrated airports are likely to internalize the e¤ects of self-imposed con-
gestion.3
While several works analyze the determinants of delays, less attention has been devoted to
the impact of delays on airline frequencies.4 The exceptions are the studies published by Pai
(2010) and Zou and Hansen (2014), which yield contradictory results. Using data for a sample
of US routes, Pai (2010) nds a negative relationship between frequencies and delays. More
precisely, he concludes that every extra minute of delay at the airports of origin or destination
could result in 2-3 fewer ights per month. By contrast, Zou and Hansen (2014), also using a
sample of US routes, nd a positive relationship between frequencies and delays.
Our analysis seeks to reconcile the results in this scarce and incipient literature by undertak-
ing a more general analysis in which we introduce a new relevant element: network structure.
In particular, we undertake an empirical analysis of the US market during the period 2005-2013
to examine the relationship between airline frequencies and delays (as a measure of airport con-
gestion) under di¤erent route structures. We study the di¤erent ways in which airlines adjust
their frequencies to airport congestion depending on the network type they operate.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the e¤ect of the network structure is
fundamental. We provide some evidence about the di¤erent reaction to congestion of carriers
operating HS networks (i.e., network carriers) as compared with carriers operating FC networks
(i.e., mainly low-cost carriers). We nd that while airlines operating FC congurations reduce
frequencies in response to more frequent delays, airlines operating HS structures increase fre-
quencies. Therefore, network airlines have incentives to keep frequencies high even if this is at
the expense of greater congestion at their hub airports. The rationale behind this result would
seem to lie in the higher yield associated with ight banks; the cost savings from an intense
exploitation of economies of tra¢ c density; and the strategic behavior of airlines that may adopt
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a preemptive strategy so as to avoid losing market power, which involves releasing slots that
might be taken over by other competing airlines.5
Our results conrm the theoretical ndings in Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015), which suggest
that congestion typically increases the protability of HS networks (since frequencies are higher
than those in FC networks). Our ndings are also in line with the empirical results in Brueckner
(2002), which show that delays are higher in hub airports after controlling for airport size and
other airport attributes. Finally, our paper goes some way to accounting for the non-existent
reaction to congestion by the merged Delta-Northwest airline reported in Bilotkach et al. (2013).
This is unlikely to have been caused by the economic downturn in 2008, but rather represents
an active decision on the part of the consolidated airline.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain the data used in
the empirical analysis. In Section 3, we specify the empirical model and state our expectations
for the explanatory variables. Section 4 deals with various econometric issues and then we
report the regression results and Section 5 provides some robustness checks. The last section
contains our concluding remarks.
2 Data
We have data for 50 large US continental airports, including all hubs and the countrys most
congested airports, during the period 2005-2013. Data on airline frequencies and ight shares
at the airport level have been obtained from RDC Aviation (Capstats Statistics), representing
an aggregation of the T-100 dataset collected by the US Department of Transportation. Since
we focus on US domestic tra¢ c, intercontinental ights are excluded from the analysis. More-
over, we only include airlines that provide at least one ight per week from the airport under
consideration. The unit of observation of our regressions is the airline-airport pair, so that our
nal sample comprises 4259 observations.
We also consider the variables that might a¤ect ight demand at the airports in our sample.
Specically, we use data on population and GDP per capita obtained from the US census, which
refer to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in which the airport is located.
An essential feature of our analysis is the distinction drawn between network airlines that op-
erate HS networks and other airlines (usually low-cost airlines) that operate FC congurations.
Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways are
identied as network airlines; and AirTran, Allegiant Air, Cape Air, Frontier, Great Lakes, Jet
Blue, Pacic Wings, Republic, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country, USA3000, and Virgin America
are identied as low-cost carriers. All network airlines are integrated in an international alliance
3
(i.e., Oneworld, Star Alliance, and SkyTeam) in the period under study, with the only excep-
tion of Alaska Airlines that has code-share agreements with several airlines integrated in airline
alliances. Note also that all network airlines rely extensively on regional carriers to feed their
ights. These regional carriers may be either subsidiaries of a network carrier or independent
airlines that have signed contracts with a network carrier.6
By denition, hub airports are those airports in which a dominant network carrier exploits
the transfer tra¢ c through coordinated banks of arrivals and departures. As such, hub airports
usually present two key characteristics: they are big and a network carrier operates a high
proportion of the airports ights.
Hence, our dataset includes the following hub airports: Portland (PDX) and Seattle (SEA)
for Alaska Airlines; Dallas (DFW), Miami (MIA), Chicago (ORD), and Saint Louis (STL) for
American Airlines;7 Cleveland (CLE), Houston (IAH), and Newark (EWR) for Continental;
Atlanta (ATL), Cincinnati (CVG), New York (JFK), and Salt Lake City (SLC) for Delta;
Detroit (DTW), Memphis (MEM), and Minneapolis (MSP) for Northwest; Chicago (ORD),
Denver (DEN), San Francisco (SFO), and Washington Dulles (IAD) for United; and Charlotte
(CLT), Philadelphia (PHL), and Phoenix (PHX) for US Airways.8
Southwest has the largest volume of passengers in terms of US domestic tra¢ c and occupies
a leading position in several airports included in our sample. Although Southwest passengers
might take advantage of a connecting ight, Southwests network can still be considered an FC.
Southwest uses just one aircraft type, it has no regional subsidiaries feeding its main airports,
and its ights are not clustered in coordinated banks of arrivals and departures. In this same
vein, Boguslaski et al. (2004) show that the bulk of Southwests tra¢ c is found on dense
point-to-point routes.
Our analysis assumes that network airlines operate in an HS manner at their hub airports,
while the rest of the airlines provide point-to-point connections (i.e., FC networks). This is a
simplication since all airlines can o¤er connecting services at any airport when their frequencies
are su¢ ciently high. However, we consider this a sensible assumption given that the bulk of HS
operations in the US domestic market constitute the services of network airlines at their hub
airports.
Here, we measure congestion at the airport level. We dene the level of congestion as
the percentage of originating ights that are delayed by more than fteen minutes at a given
airport.9 Data regarding delays have been obtained from the US Department of Transportation.
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of delayed ights at the airports in our sample. While the data in
this gure present a peak in 2007, the percentage of delayed ights was higher than 20% in all
the years of the period under consideration with the exception of 2009 and 2012. Thus, a high
proportion of ights in the US domestic market are a¤ected by delays over a relatively long
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period of time.
 Insert Fig. 1 here 
Table 1 shows some features of the airports included in our sample.10 In the case of hub
airports, the share of the dominant airline (in terms of total airport departures) is usually well
above 50%. The exceptions are New York (JFK), Chicago (ORD), and Phoenix (PHX) where
two airlines have relatively large shares, and also Denver (DEN) and Portland (PDX). In the
period considered, the percentage of delayed ights at hub airports was well above 20%, and it
was close to 30% in the most congested airports: New York (EWR and JFK), Chicago (ORD),
and Philadelphia (PHL). In fact, Salt Lake City (SLC), Seattle (SEA), Portland (PDX), and
Phoenix (PHX) are the only hub airports with a percentage of delayed ights below 20%.
 Insert Table 1 here 
Several non-hub airports are dominated by Southwest. Indeed, the share of Southwest is
above 50% in Albuquerque (ABQ), Baltimore (BWI), Dallas (DAL), Houston (HOU), Chicago
(MDW), Oakland (OAK), and Sacramento (SMF). Southwest is also clearly the leading airline
at other airports, including Las Vegas (LAS), San Diego (SAN), and San Antonio (SAT), with a
share higher than 40%. Overall, the levels of concentration at the airports dominated by South-
west may be as high as those reported for the hub airports. However, the percentage of delayed
ights at Southwest-dominated airports is usually around 20% or less. Therefore, the levels
of congestion seem to be generally lower than those registered at hub airports. The non-hub
airports at which Southwest is not the clearly dominant airline present, in general, low concentra-
tion levels and their congestion levels are similar to those reported at the Southwest-dominated
airports. However, Boston (BOS) and New York (LGA) report relatively high percentages of
delayed ights.
3 Empirical model
The hypothesis that we seek to test here is whether airlines operating under an HS structure
react less to delays than airlines operating under an FC structure. Hence, we estimate the
following equation for airline i at airport a in urban area u
Freqi;a;t = 0 + 1Delaysa;t 1 + 2D
HS
i;a + 3D
HS
i;a xDelaysa;t 1 + 4D
network_non hub
i;a
+5D
network_non hub
i;a xDelaysa;t 1 + 6D
low-cost_non-hub
i;a + 7D
low-cost_non-hub
i;a xDelaysa;t 1
+8Popu;t 1 + 9GDPpcu;t 1 + 10HHIa;t 1 + 11D
slot
a + 12D
hubs_smaller_merged_airline
i;a + t + ".
(1)
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The dependent variable (Freqi;a;t) is the total number of annual ights that each airline
o¤ers at the corresponding airport. The explanatory variables refer to year t 1 because airline
frequencies at the airport level in period t are inuenced by airport and airline features in the
previous period.
We consider a measure of airport congestion (Delaysa;t 1), which is constructed as the
percentage of total ights at an airport su¤ering a delay in excess of fteen minutes. The e¤ect
of this variable is, a priori, ambiguous. On the one hand, according to Zou and Hansen (2014),
airlines might reduce their frequencies when delays increase because of higher operation costs;
on the other hand, they might have incentives to increase frequencies to prot from higher yields
and to avoid losing market power.
Furthermore, we consider dummy variables for airlines that operate HS and FC networks.
Note that the reference case for all these dummies (observations with zero value) is airlines
ights from non-hub airports.
Regarding airlines that operate HS networks, the dummy variable DHSi;a refers to network
airline ights from/to their hubs (e.g., American Airlinesights from/to Miami (MIA)). Con-
trolling for local demand, the frequencies of network airlines at their hub airports (i.e., airlines
operating HS networks) should be higher than the frequencies of other airlines. The reason for
this is their exploitation of connecting tra¢ c, which is independent of local demand. Thus, we
expect a positive sign for the coe¢ cient associated with DHSi;a .
We make a distinction between two di¤erent types of ights operated by airlines in FC
networks. First, the dummy variableDnetwork_non hubi;a refers to ights of network airlines from/to
airports that are a hub of another network airline (i.e., United Airlinesights from/to Miami
(MIA)). Second, the dummy variable Dlow-cost_non-hubi;a refers to ights of low-cost airlines from/to
airports that are a hub of a network airline (i.e., Southwestights from/to Miami (MIA)). The
expected sign of the coe¢ cients associated with these variables is not clear a priori.
Given that our dependent variable is the frequency at the airline-airport level, we can make
the distinction between a network airline that operates at its hub airports (which is considered
as a HS carrier) and the same network airline operating at other airports (which is considered as
a FC carrier). Hence, our denition of airlines operating HS structures is based on two features:
i) being a network airline, and ii) operating at its hub airports. Consequently, we implicitly
consider that non-hub airlines at hub airports (dominated by a hub airline) operate point-to-
point services at those airports. For example, Delta concentrates a large share of its total ights
at Atlanta (ATL), where it exploits the transfer tra¢ c through coordinated banks of arrivals
and departures. By contrast, American Airlines uses Atlanta (ATL) mainly to provide direct
services from/to its hub airports.
We also include three variables that are formed from the interaction between the dummy vari-
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ables for airlines operating HS and FC networks and the measure of congestion (DHSi;a xDelaysa;t 1,
D
network_non hub
i;a xDelaysa;t 1, and D
low-cost_non-hub
i;a xDelaysa;t 1). The relationship between fre-
quencies and delays for airlines operating HS networks is determined by coe¢ cients 1 and 3,
while the same relationship for airlines operating FC networks is determined by coe¢ cients 1
and 5 on the one hand, and by coe¢ cients 1 and 7 on the other hand. Thus, we can test
whether airlines react di¤erently to congestion according to the network structure they operate
by examining the estimated coe¢ cients 3, 5, and 7. If network airlines react less to delays
at their hubs, we would expect 3 > 0, 3 > 5, and 3 > 7. These are the main hypotheses
being tested in this study.
Among the explanatory factors, we include two control variables related to local demand:
population (Popu;t 1) and GDP per capita (GDPpcu;t 1). We can expect a positive sign for the
coe¢ cients associated with these variables since airlines should have incentives to increase the
number of ights on routes that have as their endpoints airports located in more populated and
richer urban areas (i.e., areas with a higher local demand).
The Herndahl-Hirschman index in terms of ight frequencies at the airport level is also
considered an explanatory variable (HHIa;t 1). Airlines operating at more concentrated airports
typically operate higher frequencies because they have higher yields and are better able to
exploit economies of tra¢ c density. This variable may control for the strategic behavior of
airlines according to the intensity of competition in the airport. We also include a dummy
variable that takes a value of one for slot-constrained airports (Dslota ) as these constraints may
a¤ect an airlines frequency choices.11
Bilotkach et al. (2013) show that the merger between Delta and Northwest led to a reor-
ganization of route structures in favor of the hubs formerly operated by Delta. Therefore, we
include a variable that seeks to control for mergers that took place during the period under
consideration (Dhubs_smaller_merged_airlinei;a ). This variable takes a value of one for merged airlines
operating at the hubs formerly operated by the smaller airline (see footnote 10).
Finally, Eq. (1) also includes time xed e¤ects (t) to capture shocks common to all air-
ports and airlines during the period under consideration. We use the same year controls in all
regressions. The excluded year dummy is 2005 and our results do not change by excluding any
other year of the considered period.
4 Estimation and results
Eq. (1) is estimated using the xed e¤ects estimator, which allows us to control for any omitted
time-invariant variable correlated with the variables of interest. A further advantage of the
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xed e¤ects model is that it allows us to account for di¤erent types of heterogeneity in the data.
More specically, we use airline xed e¤ects to control for airline heterogeneity. Here, we can
identify the di¤erent behavior of airlines operating at the same airport. We exploit, as a source
of variation in the data, the fact that airlines can operate in the same year at hub and non-hub
airports.
A notable econometric challenge in our analysis is the possible simultaneous determination
of frequencies and delays. Note here that the frequency variable is at the airline-airport level,
while the delays variable is at the airport level. Although this could mitigate the bias in the
estimation, it is still needed to address the potential endogeneity problem. We deal with this
potential bias by using several instruments for the delays variable. First, we use further lags
as instruments. A typical shortcoming of the lags approach is that the correlation between
several lags may be high if the variable of interest has a strong inertia. However, this is not the
case in the data that is used here. The correlation between the delays variable and its lagged
values is 0:76, 0:58, 0:40, and 0:24 for one, two, three, and four lags, respectively. Lagged delays
further than four years are highly non-signicant in the rst-stage regression of the instrumental
variables procedure. Second, we also use as instruments climatic variables of the urban area
where the airport is located (temperature and precipitation).12 These variables may work as
appropriate instruments as delays should be correlated with the weather while frequency choices
of airlines should be mainly a¤ected by climatic variables through external delays imposed by
bad weather.
Tests of instrument appropriateness are reported in the table of results: i) the Hansen test,
in which the null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous, and ii) the Kleibergen-Paap
LM, in which the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not strong. The Hansen test
determines the selection of the lags that we use as instruments of the delays variable.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. All
the variables show su¢ cient variability to provide robust estimations. It is important to recall
that, although the unit of observation of our analysis is the airline-airport pair, some variables
are taken at either the airport or the urban level.
 Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of Eq. (1) using airline xed e¤ects. Standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by airline to account for any autocorrelation
problem. In specication 1, we consider all explanatory variables included in equation (1).
In specication 2, we exclude the dummy variables for slot-constrained airports and merged
airlines operating at the hubs formerly operated by the smaller airline (i.e., Dslota and
D
hubs_smaller_merged_airline
i;a ). These exclusions do not change the results for the rest of variables.
8
In specication 3, we exclude the dummy variables that identify the airline network structure
(i.e., DHSi;a , D
network_non hub
i;a , D
low-cost_non-hub
i;a ). Note here that the high correlation between these
variables and the interaction variables could pose a problem of multicollinearity that might
distort the individual identication of regressors. However, the results of these regressions are
qualitatively identical to the regressions that include all the variables.
 Insert Table 3 here 
The overall explanatory power of the model is quite high. The impact of the population
and income variables on frequencies does not seem to be relevant in our regressions, given that
the year xed e¤ects may capture some of the e¤ect of population and income. The dummy
variable for slot constrained airports and the dummy variable for merged airlines operating at
the hubs formerly operated by the smaller airline are also non-signicant in all regressions.
The coe¢ cient associated with the airport concentration variable is positive and statistically
signicant. Hence, airline frequencies at the more concentrated airports are higher. Higher
yields and a better exploitation of density economies by airlines operating at more concentrated
airports account for this result.
As expected, the coe¢ cient of DHSi;a is positive and statistically signicant. Naturally, the
frequencies of airlines operating HS structures are higher than those of other airlines as they
provide both direct and connecting services. Additionally, the coe¢ cients of Dnetwork_non hubi;a
and Dlow-cost_non-hubi;a are also positive but not statistically signicant.
The coe¢ cient associated with the delays variable is positive but not statistically signicant.
However, the relationship between frequencies and delays is jointly determined by the coe¢ cient
associated with the delays and the interaction variables. In fact, our main interest lies in the
interaction variables since our focus is on identifying the di¤erent behavior of airlines operating
either HS or FC networks.
We nd that airlines operating HS networks increase their frequencies as the percentage of
delayed ights at their hub airports increases. The coe¢ cient associated with the interaction
variable DHSi;a xDelaysa;t 1 is positive and statistically signicant. Furthermore, note that the
magnitude of the coe¢ cient of this interaction variable is higher than that of the delays variable.
By contrast, the coe¢ cients associated with the interaction variablesDnetwork_non hubi;a xDelaysa;t 1
and Dlow-cost_non-hubi;a xDelaysa;t 1 are negative and statistically signicant. The magnitude of the
coe¢ cients associated with these interaction variables are similar to that of the delays variable.
Given that Dnetwork_non hubi;a xDelaysa;t 1 and D
low-cost_non-hub
i;a xDelaysa;t 1 refer to non-hub
airlines operating at hub airports, our results indicate that airlines operating at other airlines
hub airports may be more prone to reduce their frequencies than hub airlines in reaction to
more frequent delays at such airports.
9
In short, we nd evidence of a di¤erentiated behavior between airlines operating HS and
FC networks. Indeed, the estimated coe¢ cients of the interaction variables clearly indicate this
result since 3 > 0, 3 > 5, and 3 > 7. Hence, our results suggest that airlines operating
HS networks have incentives to maintain high frequencies at their hubs even when congestion
at these airports increases.
The results of our analysis may reconcile the conicting results obtained in previous studies
examining the impact of delays on airline frequencies (see Pai, 2010; and Zou and Hansen, 2014).
The positive relationship between airline frequencies and delays arises when airlines operate HS
structures, while the negative relationship characterizes FC congurations.
Our results are in line with those obtained by Daniel and Harback (2008), which show that
dominant airlines at many major US hub airports concentrate ights in departure/arrival banks
during peak periods, constraining non-hub airlines to cluster their tra¢ c in the uncongested
periods. In fact, our aggregate measure of delays could behave as a proxy for concentrated
ight banks of dominant hub carriers. In such a case, the positive e¤ect of delays on frequencies
that we nd for airlines operating HS networks could be related to the benets they obtain from
their having dominated departure/arrival banks at their hub airports.
Therefore, network airlines have incentives to keep frequencies high even if this comes at
the expense of greater airport congestion at their hub airports. The rationale behind this result
would seem to lie in the higher yield associated with ight banks; the cost savings from an
intense exploitation of economies of tra¢ c density; and the strategic behavior of airlines that
may adopt a preemptive strategy so as to avoid losing market power which involves releasing
slots that might be taken over by other competing airlines.
Our results are consistent with the empirical ndings in Brueckner (2002), which show that
delays are higher in hub airports, and conrm the theoretical results in Fageda and Flores-
Fillol (2015), which suggest that congestion typically increases the protability of HS net-
works. Finally, our ndings explain the non-existent reaction to congestion by the merged
Delta-Northwest airline reported in Bilotkach et al. (2013), which is not likely to have been
caused by the economic downturn in 2008 but rather represents an active decision on the part
of the consolidated airline.
5 Robustness checks
In this section, we report and comment the results of some additional regressions that provide
several robustness checks. In Table 4, we show the results using di¤erent instruments of the
lagged delays variable. In specication 1, we use as instruments three and four lags of the delays
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variable. Results of this regression are very similar to those reported in the previous section
where we use as instruments three and four lags of the delays variable along with the climatic
variables.
In specication 2, we only use the climatic variables as instruments (i.e., rain and tem-
perature of the urban area where the airport is located). In this regression, the coe¢ cient
of DHSi;a is positive but not statistically signicant while the coe¢ cients of D
network_non hub
i;a
and Dlow-cost_non-hubi;a are negative and not statistically signicant. Regarding the interaction
variables, the coe¢ cient of DHSi;a xDelaysa;t 1 is positive and statistically signicant while the
coe¢ cients of Dnetwork_non hubi;a xDelaysa;t 1 and D
low-cost_non-hub
i;a xDelaysa;t 1 are also positive
but not statistically signicant. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient of DHSi;a xDelaysa;t 1 is much
higher than those of the other interaction variables. Hence, this regression conrm our main
result, i.e., 3 > 0, 3 > 5, and 3 > 7.
Thus, the use of di¤erent sets of instruments does not seem to alter our conclusion regarding
the relationship between frequencies and delays under di¤erent network structures. Having said
this, we must be cautious in the interpretation of the results as the reverse causality between
frequencies and delays can still be considered a cause for concern.
 Insert Table 4 here 
In Table 5, we show the results using di¤erent variables to identify airlines operating FC
networks. In specication 1, the interaction variableDnon hubi;a xDelaysa;t 1 refers to the ights of
non-hub airlines at hub airports (e.g., American Airlinesights and Southwests ights from/to
Atlanta (ATL)). This regression does not distinguish between network and low-cost carriers in
its identication of airlines operating FC congurations. The results of this regression are very
similar to those reported in the previous section where we make a distinction between network
and low-cost airlines operating in hub airports of other airlines.
In specication 2, we run the regression using airport xed e¤ects instead of airline xed
e¤ects. Here, we can control for airport heterogeneity, so that the di¤erent behavior of air-
lines operating at di¤erent airports can be identied. Hence, DHSi;a is the same as that in the
regression with airline specic e¤ects and Dlow-cost_dominanti;a is a dummy variable that takes the
value one for dominant airlines operating at non-hub airports. We consider as dominant those
airlines that have a share of total ights at the airport greater than 50%. Thus, this regression
draws a distinction between network airlines operating at their hub airports (e.g., American
Airlinesights from/to Dallas (DFW)) and low-cost airlines operating at their main airports
(e.g., Southwests ights from/to Dallas (DAL)). Both American Airlines and Southwest con-
centrate a very high proportion of total ights at Dallas (DFW) and Dallas (DAL), respectively.
However, American Airlines exploits the transfer tra¢ c through coordinated banks of arrivals
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and departures at Dallas (DFW), while the bulk of the activity of Southwest at Dallas (DAL) is
based on point-to-point services. With airport xed e¤ects, we exploit as a source of variation
in the data the fact that airports may be dominated by di¤erent types of airline (i.e., either
network or low-cost airlines).
In this regression, the coe¢ cients of DHSi;a and D
low-cost_dominant
i;a are positive and statistically
signicant. More importantly, the coe¢ cient of DHSi;a xDelaysa;t 1 is positive and statistically
signicant while the coe¢ cient of Dlow-cost_dominanti;a xDelaysa;t 1 is negative and statistically sig-
nicant. In contrast to airlines operating HS networks, we nd that dominant airlines operating
at non-hub airports (i.e., Southwest) clearly reduce their frequencies as delays at these airports
increase. Taking into account the results reported in Tables 3 and 5, we can conclude that our
main results seem to be driven by both low-cost airlines and network airlines operating in hub
airports dominated by a di¤erent network airline.
 Insert Table 5 here 
In Table 6, we show the results using di¤erent indicators of delays. In specication 1, we
use the number of delayed ights, i.e., the number of ights su¤ering a delay in excess of fteen
minutes. In this regression, the airport concentration variable is not statistically signicant
while the delays variable is positive and statistically signicant. Regarding our variables of
main interest, we nd that airlines operating HS networks increase their frequencies as the
number of delayed ights at their hub airports increases, while airlines operating FC networks
in hub airports reduce frequencies as the number of delayed ights in those airports increase.
In specication 2, we use total minutes of delay. It should be noted that early arrivals are
set to zero in the computation of total minutes of delays. The results of this regression conrm
the di¤erent behavior of airlines operating HS and FC networks as delays increase.
 Insert Table 6 here 
Finally, Table 7 shows the results of the estimates for di¤erent sub-samples depending on the
distribution of the concentration variable at the airport level. More precisely, in specications
1 and 2, we show the results for two di¤erent sub-samples excluding observations with values
in the lowest and highest quartile of the concentration variable, respectively. These regressions
that exclude the tails of the distribution of the concentration variable allow examining the extent
to which the level of competition distorts the results on the relationship between frequencies
and delays according to the airline network type. The results of these regressions suggest that
our main result is not altered using a more homogenous sample in terms of airport competition.
Interestingly, specication 2 (that excludes the most concentrated airports) may be helpful
in addressing the potential endogeneity bias. Given that the dependent variable is at the airline-
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airport level and the delays variable is at the airport level, the endogeneity bias should be more
severe for more concentrated airports in which the share of the dominant airline is particularly
high.
Furthermore, in specications 3 and 4, we show the results for two di¤erent sub-samples
that only include observations with values in the second and third quartile of the concentration
variable, respectively. Regressions for the rst and fourth quartile are not included here since
most of observations in the highest quartile are for hub airports (84% observations) while no
observations for hub airports can be found in the lowest quartile. The results of these regressions
suggest that the e¤ect that we want to identify is stronger in the third quartile, i.e., when the
market power of the hubbing airline (approximated by its share) is higher. This result suggests
that airlines operating HS structures may follow a preemptive strategy to avoid losing market
power when they keep frequencies high at their hub airports, even if this comes at the expense
of greater congestion.
 Insert Table 7 here 
6 Concluding remarks
The importance of connecting tra¢ c at hub airports (compared to that of local tra¢ c) is
dependent on the extensive number of potential destinations, which is of obvious benet to HS
networks and, consequently, to the urban areas around hubs. However, the concentration of
tra¢ c favored by HS networks has contributed to an increase in airport congestion resulting in
delays, cancellations, and missed connections.
Our analysis suggests that airlines operating FC networks reduce frequencies in response to
more frequent delays, while airlines operating HS structures increase frequencies. Thus, airlines
operating HS networks seem to ignore the social costs (i.e., airport congestion) resulting from
their network choice. This explains the fact that network carriers are reluctant to give up slots
at their hub airports.
Airport congestion has yet to be adequately tackled from a public policy perspective. This is
attributable to various factors including the di¢ culties encountered in implementing congestion
pricing and the high investment costs associated with airport expansions. In addition, while at
many large European airports slot constraints are the norm, in the US market only four airports
are slot-constrained (OHare in Chicago, Ronald Reagan in Washington, and La Guardia and
JFK in New York.).13 Thus, congestion remains a severe problem in the air transportation
industry, and it is especially grave in the US.
As a consequence, our model predicts a further reinforcement of the existing hub airports
13
over time. Indeed, we expect the current distribution of hubs to remain stable in the near future
as diverting tra¢ c from these airports seems complicated because airlines have no incentives
to do so. Although our analysis provides evidence about the airlinesshort-term responses to
congestion in terms of network structure, long term responses may not be too di¤erent given
the strong incentives for network airlines to concentrate tra¢ c at their hubs.
Since network airlines do not react to congestion, policy measures promoting direct connec-
tions at non-hub airports may have social benets should problems of congestion become too
severe. Policy makers and airport operators might adopt such tools as congestion tolls, capacity
investment, and a better marketing of cities in which the non-hub airports are located. Addi-
tionally, the rules determining the allocation and use of slots in the US might also be redesigned
so as to create incentives for airlines to increase the size of their aircraft and reduce their ight
frequencies.
A project for future research is to quantify empirically the externalities associated with hub
airports, given that HS networks impose social costs on other airlines and passengers (in terms
of congestion) but, at the same time, passengers ying from hub airports benet from higher
frequencies and a greater number of non-stop destinations. It is an open empirical question as
to which of these two e¤ects might be more important from a social perspective. Of course,
access to aggregated passenger data would be required to perform this comprehensive welfare
analysis of HS networks.
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Notes
1It is generally accepted that the route operations of airlines are subject to density economies (Brueckner and
Spiller, 1994), and that airlines can attract more connecting passengers in a HS structure by increasing service
frequency than by increasing aircraft size (Wei and Hansen, 2006).
2For instance, McDonald and McMillen (2000) discuss the centripetal force of Chicago OHare airport for
industrial and commercial activities.
3Daniel (1995) is the rst that recognizes the potential for internalization. However, he supports the idea that
carriers behave atomistically due to the competitive pressure exerted by fringe carriers (a result that is conrmed
16
in Daniel and Harback, 2008). Di¤erently, Brueckner (2002) proposes a model that relates internalization of
congestion with market power. Mayer and Sinai (2003) demonstrate that, even though delays at hub airports
can be longer than those at non-hub gateways, increasing airport concentration does reduce these delays. Rupp
(2009), however, reverses Mayer and Sinais ndings, using a di¤erent measure of delays. Brueckner and Van
Dender (2008) seek a consensus in the internalization debate by showing that some competitive scenarios do
lead to self-internalization, while others do not.
4Several empirical studies have examined the determinants of airline frequencies at the route level. These
studies have generally focused on the e¤ects of either route or airport competition (see, for example, Bilotkach
et al., 2010 and 2013, and Fageda, 2014).
5It is true that low-cost carrierspassengers may have a lower cost of time (as compared to network carriers
passengers) and that this could be reason for these carriers to incur longer delays. However, our results suggest
that there are other factors that overcome this e¤ect and explain the incentives for network carriers to incur
longer delays (i.e., the higher yield associated with ight banks; the cost savings from an intense exploitation of
economies of tra¢ c density; and the strategic behavior of airlines).
6Our data set assigns the ight to the major carrier in those cases where it is operated by a regional carrier
on behalf of the major carrier.
7American Airlines eliminated its hub at Saint Louis (STL) in 2010. Hence, our sample includes Saint Louis
as a hub airport until 2009.
8Several network airlines have instigated a de-hubbing process in the period under consideration. For example,
the share of American Airlines at Saint Louis was 57% in 2005 falling to just 12% by 2013, and the share of
US Airways at Pittsburg was 68% in 2005 but had fallen to 29% by 2013. Thus, we do not consider these two
airports to be hubs although they served this function in a previous period. Note that while the share of Delta in
Cincinnati was 92% in 2005, it had fallen to 64% by 2013. Although it seems that Delta is gradually dismantling
its hub in Cincinnati, it still maintains a high volume of connection operations. Thus, this airport is considered
as being a hub.
9Previous empirical studies of the determinants of delays (Mayer and Sinai, 2003; Rupp, 2009; Ater, 2012)
use data at the ight level and measure congestion as the di¤erence between the actual and scheduled time
and/or the di¤erence between the actual and the minimum feasible time of the ight. For the purposes of our
empirical analysis, which is the study of the inuence of delays on the frequency choices of airlines at the airport
level, such a disaggregated analysis is not needed.
10Several merger operations have taken place in the period under consideration. For example, since 2010 the
ights of Northwest have been operated by Delta, so that the dominant network carrier at Minneapolis (MSP),
Detroit (DTW), and Memphis (MEM) since 2010 has been Delta and not Northwest. Likewise, since 2012 the
ights of Continental have been operated by United, so that the dominant network carrier at Cleveland (CLE),
Houston (IAH), and Newark (EWR) since 2012 has been United and not Continental. The merger between
American Airlines and US Airways came into e¤ect at the end of 2013 but integration is not yet complete and
does not a¤ect our analysis.
11Only four airports are slot-constrained in the US: Chicago (ORD), New York (JFK), Washington (DCA),
and New York (LGA). Among them, Chicago (ORD) and New York (JFK) can be considered hub airports.
12Data for climatic variables have been obtained from the web site of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA).
13Brueckner (2009) nds that a slot-distribution regime, where slots are distributed to the carriers and then
traded through a clearing house, is equivalent to an e¢ cient regime of di¤erentiated congestion tolls. He
17
recommends that airlines be endowed with clearer property rights over slots to foster more active slot trading.
18
Figures and Tables
Fig. 1: Evolution of the percentage of delayed ights at airports in our sample
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